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ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION ›› 2022, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (1): 104-112.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.01.012
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WANG Jingcai(), LI Yan(), XU Tianqi()
Received:
2021-04-29
Online:
2022-01-01
Published:
2021-12-21
Contact:
LI Yan
E-mail:603111560@qq.com;liyanhustkm@163.com;xu.tianqi@ymu.edu.cn
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CLC Number:
WANG Jingcai, LI Yan, XU Tianqi. Modeling of False Data Injection Attack and Rapid Screening of Vulnerable Lines Under Attack[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2022, 43(1): 104-112.
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URL: https://www.cepc.com.cn/EN/10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.01.012
迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 14 | -0.707 3 | 11 | 29 | -0.899 9 | 21 | 33 | -0.662 3 |
2 | 6 | 2.034 1 | 12 | 21 | -1.326 8 | 22 | 14 | -0.707 3 |
3 | 17 | 4.209 4 | 13 | 8 | -0.826 6 | 23 | 22 | -1.091 1 |
4 | 16 | 3.420 7 | 14 | 24 | 1.522 4 | 24 | 30 | 0.763 3 |
5 | 2 | 1.811 3 | 15 | 3 | 0.884 8 | 25 | 26 | 0.849 2 |
6 | 1 | -1.148 4 | 16 | 25 | -0.813 3 | 26 | 28 | -0.661 7 |
7 | 7 | -1.367 7 | 17 | 20 | -0.820 0 | 27 | 43 | -0.672 2 |
8 | 31 | 3.671 7 | 18 | 32 | 1.502 8 | 28 | 44 | -0.653 8 |
9 | 40 | 1.817 5 | 19 | 42 | 0.783 6 | 29 | 41 | -0.642 3 |
10 | 5 | -1.000 0 | 20 | 36 | 1.583 7 | 30 | 46 | -0.640 9 |
Table 1 The iterative process of rapid screening when the initial line is selected as 14 in IEEE 39-bus system
迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 14 | -0.707 3 | 11 | 29 | -0.899 9 | 21 | 33 | -0.662 3 |
2 | 6 | 2.034 1 | 12 | 21 | -1.326 8 | 22 | 14 | -0.707 3 |
3 | 17 | 4.209 4 | 13 | 8 | -0.826 6 | 23 | 22 | -1.091 1 |
4 | 16 | 3.420 7 | 14 | 24 | 1.522 4 | 24 | 30 | 0.763 3 |
5 | 2 | 1.811 3 | 15 | 3 | 0.884 8 | 25 | 26 | 0.849 2 |
6 | 1 | -1.148 4 | 16 | 25 | -0.813 3 | 26 | 28 | -0.661 7 |
7 | 7 | -1.367 7 | 17 | 20 | -0.820 0 | 27 | 43 | -0.672 2 |
8 | 31 | 3.671 7 | 18 | 32 | 1.502 8 | 28 | 44 | -0.653 8 |
9 | 40 | 1.817 5 | 19 | 42 | 0.783 6 | 29 | 41 | -0.642 3 |
10 | 5 | -1.000 0 | 20 | 36 | 1.583 7 | 30 | 46 | -0.640 9 |
迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 21 | -1.326 8 | 11 | 5 | -1.000 0 | 21 | 1 | -1.148 4 |
2 | 31 | 3.671 7 | 12 | 26 | 0.849 2 | 22 | 15 | 0.787 5 |
3 | 40 | 1.817 5 | 13 | 24 | 1.522 4 | 23 | 11 | 0.729 4 |
4 | 17 | 4.209 4 | 14 | 3 | 0.884 8 | 24 | 14 | -0.707 3 |
5 | 16 | 3.420 7 | 15 | 25 | -0.813 3 | 25 | 30 | 0.763 3 |
6 | 2 | 1.811 3 | 16 | 20 | -0.820 0 | 26 | 8 | -0.826 6 |
7 | 6 | 2.034 1 | 17 | 32 | 1.502 8 | 27 | 4 | -0.779 9 |
8 | 22 | -1.091 1 | 18 | 42 | 0.783 6 | 28 | 43 | -0.672 2 |
9 | 7 | -1.367 7 | 19 | 36 | 1.583 7 | 29 | 44 | -0.653 8 |
10 | 29 | -0.899 9 | 20 | 33 | -0.662 3 |
Table 2 The iterative process of rapid screening when the initial line is selected as 21 in IEEE 39-bus system
迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 21 | -1.326 8 | 11 | 5 | -1.000 0 | 21 | 1 | -1.148 4 |
2 | 31 | 3.671 7 | 12 | 26 | 0.849 2 | 22 | 15 | 0.787 5 |
3 | 40 | 1.817 5 | 13 | 24 | 1.522 4 | 23 | 11 | 0.729 4 |
4 | 17 | 4.209 4 | 14 | 3 | 0.884 8 | 24 | 14 | -0.707 3 |
5 | 16 | 3.420 7 | 15 | 25 | -0.813 3 | 25 | 30 | 0.763 3 |
6 | 2 | 1.811 3 | 16 | 20 | -0.820 0 | 26 | 8 | -0.826 6 |
7 | 6 | 2.034 1 | 17 | 32 | 1.502 8 | 27 | 4 | -0.779 9 |
8 | 22 | -1.091 1 | 18 | 42 | 0.783 6 | 28 | 43 | -0.672 2 |
9 | 7 | -1.367 7 | 19 | 36 | 1.583 7 | 29 | 44 | -0.653 8 |
10 | 29 | -0.899 9 | 20 | 33 | -0.662 3 |
迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 18 | 1.386 0 | 21 | 65 | 2.106 8 | 41 | 121 | 0.894 6 |
2 | 186 | 2.106 8 | 22 | 94 | 3.411 3 | 42 | 88 | 1.000 0 |
3 | 115 | 3.411 3 | 23 | 57 | 1.000 0 | 43 | 95 | 1.0007 |
4 | 109 | 1.000 0 | 24 | 173 | -1.160 9 | 44 | 156 | 2.106 8 |
5 | 126 | -1.255 1 | 25 | 153 | -1.085 5 | 45 | 128 | 3.411 3 |
6 | 127 | -1.085 5 | 26 | 78 | 1.000 0 | 46 | 91 | 1.000 0 |
7 | 178 | 1.422 6 | 27 | 77 | 1.159 3 | 47 | 134 | -1.160 9 |
8 | 112 | 1.159 3 | 28 | 92 | 0.501 7 | 48 | 140 | -1.085 5 |
9 | 30 | 0.501 7 | 29 | 131 | 0.883 8 | 49 | 143 | 1.000 0 |
10 | 179 | 1.016 2 | 30 | 98 | -0.844 9 | 50 | 32 | 1.159 0 |
11 | 46 | 1.122 6 | 31 | 25 | -0.639 9 | 51 | 158 | 0.501 7 |
12 | 60 | 1.493 9 | 32 | 22 | 2.981 2 | 52 | 56 | -1.173 0 |
13 | 175 | 1.185 8 | 33 | 20 | -1.222 6 | 53 | 110 | 0.717 8 |
14 | 169 | 1.406 7 | 34 | 3 | -0.658 8 | 54 | 45 | 1.000 0 |
15 | 155 | 1.000 0 | 35 | 46 | 1.122 6 | 55 | 12 | -1.160 9 |
16 | 102 | -1.000 0 | 36 | 8 | 0.667 0 | 56 | 89 | 0.951 8 |
17 | 182 | 2.981 2 | 37 | 37 | -1.000 0 | 57 | 129 | -1.001 3 |
18 | 62 | -1.000 9 | 38 | 93 | 0.872 4 | 58 | 171 | -0.952 7 |
19 | 130 | -0.917 4 | 39 | 99 | -0.913 6 | 59 | 82 | 1.102 9 |
20 | 79 | 1.493 9 | 40 | 159 | 0.826 7 | 60 | 55 | 0.845 0 |
Table 3 The iterative process of rapid screening when the initial line is selected as 18 in IEEE 118-bus system
迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 | 迭代次数 | 线路号 | 潮流占比 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 18 | 1.386 0 | 21 | 65 | 2.106 8 | 41 | 121 | 0.894 6 |
2 | 186 | 2.106 8 | 22 | 94 | 3.411 3 | 42 | 88 | 1.000 0 |
3 | 115 | 3.411 3 | 23 | 57 | 1.000 0 | 43 | 95 | 1.0007 |
4 | 109 | 1.000 0 | 24 | 173 | -1.160 9 | 44 | 156 | 2.106 8 |
5 | 126 | -1.255 1 | 25 | 153 | -1.085 5 | 45 | 128 | 3.411 3 |
6 | 127 | -1.085 5 | 26 | 78 | 1.000 0 | 46 | 91 | 1.000 0 |
7 | 178 | 1.422 6 | 27 | 77 | 1.159 3 | 47 | 134 | -1.160 9 |
8 | 112 | 1.159 3 | 28 | 92 | 0.501 7 | 48 | 140 | -1.085 5 |
9 | 30 | 0.501 7 | 29 | 131 | 0.883 8 | 49 | 143 | 1.000 0 |
10 | 179 | 1.016 2 | 30 | 98 | -0.844 9 | 50 | 32 | 1.159 0 |
11 | 46 | 1.122 6 | 31 | 25 | -0.639 9 | 51 | 158 | 0.501 7 |
12 | 60 | 1.493 9 | 32 | 22 | 2.981 2 | 52 | 56 | -1.173 0 |
13 | 175 | 1.185 8 | 33 | 20 | -1.222 6 | 53 | 110 | 0.717 8 |
14 | 169 | 1.406 7 | 34 | 3 | -0.658 8 | 54 | 45 | 1.000 0 |
15 | 155 | 1.000 0 | 35 | 46 | 1.122 6 | 55 | 12 | -1.160 9 |
16 | 102 | -1.000 0 | 36 | 8 | 0.667 0 | 56 | 89 | 0.951 8 |
17 | 182 | 2.981 2 | 37 | 37 | -1.000 0 | 57 | 129 | -1.001 3 |
18 | 62 | -1.000 9 | 38 | 93 | 0.872 4 | 58 | 171 | -0.952 7 |
19 | 130 | -0.917 4 | 39 | 99 | -0.913 6 | 59 | 82 | 1.102 9 |
20 | 79 | 1.493 9 | 40 | 159 | 0.826 7 | 60 | 55 | 0.845 0 |
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