A Multi-Stage Game Based Defense Method against False Data Injection Attack on Cyber Physical Power System

doi:DOI： 10.3969/j.issn.1000-7229.2019.05.006

Abstract

Abstract: With the great development of the information communication technology， power systems have been typical cyber physical system （CPS）. Although the control function of the grid side is becoming more intelligent， cyber physical power system（CPPS）brings the risk of potential cyber attacks. In this paper， the feasibility of false data injection attack （FDIA） for CPPS is analyzed firstly， then a defense method for key measurement devices is proposed on the basis of game theory for the multi-stage dynamic interaction process between attacker and defender. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method are verified on the IEEE standard system.

Key words: cyber physical power system, cyber attack, zero-sum game, false data injection attack（FDIA）

CLC Number:

TM 73

CAI Xingpu， WANG Qi， TAI Wei， LIU Keyan. A Multi-Stage Game Based Defense Method against False Data Injection Attack on Cyber Physical Power System[J]. Electric Power Construction, 2019, 40(5): 48-54.

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