• CSCD核心库收录期刊
  • 中文核心期刊
  • 中国科技核心期刊

电力建设 ›› 2020, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (9): 1-9.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2020.09.001

• 虚拟电厂 ·栏目主持 胡泽春副教授、刘敦楠副教授、王宣元高级工程师· • 上一篇    下一篇

用户侧利益主体虚拟电厂联盟行为及交易机制

胡嘉凯1,2, 蒋传文1, 李磊3   

  1. 1.上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院, 上海市200240
    2.国网上海市电力公司市南供电公司,上海市 200233
    3.上海电力交易中心有限公司,上海市 200122
  • 收稿日期:2020-03-25 出版日期:2020-09-01 发布日期:2020-09-03
  • 通讯作者: 蒋传文
  • 作者简介:胡嘉凯(1986),男,博士,主要研究方向为电力市场、交易策略优化;|李磊(1963),男,硕士,主要研究方向为电力市场运营和电力系统运行方式。
  • 基金资助:
    国网上海市电力公司科技项目(SGTYHT/17-JS-199)

Research on Coalitional Strategy and Mechanism of Demand-Side Entities by Virtual Power Plant

HU Jiakai1,2, JIANG Chuanwen1, LI Lei3   

  1. 1. School of Electric Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
    2. Shinan Power Supply Company, State Grid Shanghai Electric Power Company, Shanghai 200233,China
    3. Shanghai Electric Power Trading Center Co., Ltd., Shanghai 200122, China
  • Received:2020-03-25 Online:2020-09-01 Published:2020-09-03
  • Contact: JIANG Chuanwen

摘要:

由于分布式能源补贴下降,通过聚合形成虚拟电厂参与日前市场竞价的模式成为了用户侧利益主体新的收益渠道。文章从虚拟电厂交易策略、收益分配以及用户侧利益主体博弈形成虚拟电厂3个环节为这一模式的实现设计了完整的交易机制。在交易策略方面,采用价格制定者型虚拟电厂交易策略模型,并结合区间优化方法对不确定量建模。在收益分配方面,设计了基于发电量及不确定性贡献度的分配机制。在虚拟电厂的形成问题中,基于联盟博弈理论分析各种联盟状态的稳定性,并通过博弈确定虚拟电厂形式。最后,通过算例对所提方法的有效性进行验证,结果显示,所提出的交易机制符合用户侧利益主体的特点,其分配机制考虑了参与者对不确定性的平抑作用,能够为用户侧利益主体提供辅助决策。

关键词: 用户侧利益主体, 虚拟电厂, 价格制定者, 联盟博弈

Abstract:

As the subsidies of distributed resources decrease, to bid in day-ahead market by forming virtual power plant becomes a new income channel for demand-side entities. This paper designs a complete transaction mechanism from three parts to realize this mode such as bidding strategy, profit distribution and the formation of virtual power plant competing by demand-side entities. The bidding strategy model of price-maker virtual power plant is proposed, and the uncertainty is modeled on the basis of interval optimization. In addition, a generation quantity and uncertainty contribution based allocation mechanism is designed to distribute the profit. Then, this paper analyzes the stability of each coalition status to study the formation of virtual power plant. Finally, an example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. The results show that the proposed transaction mechanism conforms to the characteristics of the user-side stakeholders, and its allocation mechanism takes into account the stabilizing effect of participants on uncertainty, which can provide auxiliary decision-making for the user side stakeholders.

Key words: demand-side entities, virtual power plant, price maker, coalition game

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