绿电消纳责任权重下火电厂商市场行为的演化博弈

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2020.10.003

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为保障省级区域的可再生能源电量在电力消费中的占比,政府推出了可再生能源消纳责任权重考核制度,受考核方从发电侧转移至用户侧。考核方式的变动,将很大程度影响火电厂商的利益和参与绿色证书(tradable green certificate,TGC)交易的积极性。火电在我国的发电占比较高,火电厂商能否积极响应绿电市场,将极大影响新政策的实施效果。政府需要设置合理的政策参数引导火电厂商的交易策略,以实现理想的博弈均衡结果。以此新变动构建了有限理性下结合绿电厂商、火电厂商、受考核用户三方的演化博弈理论(evolutionary game theory,EGT)模型,模拟了不同参数条件下的火电厂商策略演化和TGC市场的变化趋势。研究结果表明:现有条件下政策参数在±10%波动内所有火电厂商都会达到参与TGC交易的理想演化稳定策略(evolutionary stable strategies,ESS)点。但当政策负担加重时,火电厂商达到ESS点的速率都将大幅减缓。政府应维持或适当降低现阶段政策负担水平,促使火电厂商积极响应TGC交易,以保障新政策高效稳定的推行。

关键词: 发电厂商, 演化博弈理论(EGT), 绿色证书(TGC), 消纳责任权重

Abstract:

In order to ensure the proportion of renewable energy in power consumption in provincial regions, the government has introduced an assessment system for the responsibility weight of renewable energy consumption, which transfers the assessed party from the generation side to the user side. The change of assessment method will greatly affect the interests of thermal power producers and their enthusiasm to participate in tradeable green certificate (TGC). Thermal power accounts for a relatively high proportion of electricity generation in China. Whether thermal power producers respond positively to the green power market will greatly affect the implementation effect of the new policy. The government needs to set reasonable policy parameters to guide the trading strategies of thermal power producers so as to achieve the ideal equilibrium result of the game. According to the new changes, this paper constructs an evolutionary game theory (EGT) model that combines green power producers, thermal power producers and assessed users under bounded rationality, and simulates the evolution of thermal power producers’ strategies and the changing trend of TGC market under different parameters. The results show that, under the existing conditions, all thermal power producers will reach the ideal evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) point to participate in TGC trading within the policy parameter fluctuation of ±10%. However, when the policy burden increases, the rate of thermal power producers to reach ESS point will slow down significantly. The government should maintain or appropriately reduce the current policy burden level, and encourage thermal power producers to actively respond to TGC transactions, so as to ensure the efficient and stable implementation of the new policy.

Key words: power generation producer, evolutionary game theory (EGT), tradable green certificate (TGC), weight of accommodation responsibility

中图分类号:

TM73

刘敦楠, 汪伟业, 李鹏飞, 李根柱, 范晨凯, 韩金山. 绿电消纳责任权重下火电厂商市场行为的演化博弈[J]. 电力建设, 2020, 41(10): 20-29.

LIU Dunnan, WANG Weiye, LI Pengfei, LI Genzhu, FAN Chenkai, HAN Jinshan. Evolutionary Game Theory Study on the Commercial Market Behavior of Thermal Power Plants Under Renewable Portfolio Standard Policy[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2020, 41(10): 20-29.

图/表 15

图1 消纳责任权重机理分析

Fig.1 Diagram of renewable portfolio standard mechanism analysis

图2 演化博弈流程

Fig.2 Flowchart for evolutionary game theory

表1 模型变量及含义

Table 1 Model variables and explanations

图3 扩展式演化博弈

Fig.3 Extended evolutionary game theory

表2 演化博弈中各博弈主体的支付函数

Table 2 The payment function of each player in the evolutionary game

图4 火电厂单方稳定性策略变化

Fig.4 Change of unilateral stability strategy for thermal power plant

图5 受考核用户单方稳定性策略变化

Fig.5 Change of unilateral stability strategy for assessed users

表3 火电厂商与受考核用户策略稳定条件表

Table 3 Strategic stability conditions for thermal power producers and assessed users

图6 火电厂商与受考核用户策略演化

Fig.6 Evolution of strategies between thermal power producers and assessed users

表4 2018年北京电力构成

Table 4 Beijing electric power composition in 2018

表5 基准参数赋值表

Table 5 Assignment of benchmark parameters

图7 初始值变化对火电厂商演化结果的影响

Fig.7 The influence of initial value change on the evolution of thermal power plant

图8 配额比例浮动10%的演化博弈影响

Fig.8 The influence of quota proportion fluctuation of 10% on evolutionary game

图9 TGC基准价格浮动10%的演化博弈影响

Fig.9 The influence of TGC benchmark price fluctuation of 10% on evolutionary game

图10 交易成本浮动10%的演化博弈影响

Fig.10 The influence of transaction costs fluctuation of 10% on evolutionary game

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