适应高比例新能源发展的电力市场容量保障机制分析

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2021.03.014

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着全球电力系统的低碳转型,在现有电力市场框架下,能否通过市场机制释放合理价格信号来保障电力系统中灵活性电源与可靠性后备容量的充裕性,是否需要设置容量保障机制,以及如何进行容量保障机制设计,已成为维持电力系统可持续性发展的重要课题。文章首先讨论了高比例新能源电力系统采用单一能量市场模式可能出现的发电充裕性问题,通过构建发电技术筛选曲线模型量化分析了该问题;然后概述归纳了国外成熟电力市场中容量保障机制设计的机理及具体内容,提炼出容量保障机制设计的三大要素;最后,指出我国电力市场容量市场机制设计面临的问题并提出相关建议。

关键词: 波动性新能源发展, 电力市场设计, 容量保障机制, 发电充裕性

Abstract:

As the global trend to low-carbon power system transition, under the current power market framework, whether the market mechanisms can release correct price signals to ensure the adequacy of flexible power supply and reliable backup capacity in power system, whether the capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM, or CM) is necessary, and how to design the CRM are important issues for maintaining the sustainability of the power market. This paper firstly discusses the possible generation adequacy problems that may arise when a single energy market model is adopted for a high proportion of new energy power system, and quantifies the problems by constructing a screening curve model for power generation technology. Secondly, this paper summarizes the mechanism and specific contents of capacity remuneration mechanism design in foreign mature power market, and extracts three key elements of capacity remuneration mechanism design. Lastly, this paper points out the problems of capacity market mechanism design in China’s power market and provides forward relevant suggestions.

Key words: variable renewable energy development, power market design, capacity remuneration mechanisms, generation adequacy

中图分类号:

TM73

张涛, 胡娱欧, 张晶, 韩亮, 王佩雯, 何淼, 陈雨果. 适应高比例新能源发展的电力市场容量保障机制分析[J]. 电力建设, 2021, 42(3): 117-125.

ZHANG Tao, HU Yuou, ZHANG Jing, HAN Liang, WANG Peiwen, HE Miao, CHEN Yuguo. Analysis of Power Market Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms Adapted to High Penetration of Renewable Energy Development[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2021, 42(3): 117-125.

图/表 10

图1 批发电力市场体系架构[10]

Fig.1 Wholesale power market structure

图2 发电技术筛选曲线模型

Fig.2 Screening curve model

表1 最优发电容量组合

Table 1 Optimal generation capacity mixGW

表2 容量保障机制分类

Table 2 CRMs classification

表3 PJM容量市场各类型电源净成本标准[21]

Table 3 2020 net CONE values for different resource types in PJM RPM

表4 美国电力市场风电容量可信度与计算方法[22]

Table 4 Wind capacity credit and calculation methods in US

表5 2009—2019年中国发电装机构成

Table 5 China installed capacity Mix during 2009—2019TW

表6 2009—2019年中国发电量构成占比

Table 6 China generation percentage by technology during 2009—2019

图3 2018年各国用户平均停电时间对比[24]

Fig.3 SAIDI global comparison

图4 区域外容量资源交换

Fig.4 Cross-zone capacity resource exchange

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