虚假数据注入攻击建模及攻击下脆弱线路的快速筛选

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.01.012

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着电网与通信网的高度融合,虚假数据注入攻击已经成为了目前电网的一种安全隐患。为了更好保障电网安全稳定运行,在信息物理高度融合的背景下,首先建立一种电力信息物理系统虚假数据注入攻击的双层攻击模型,其中上层模型表示攻击者的攻击策略,下层模型代表电网在该攻击下的响应,并利用卡罗需-库恩-塔克(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker,KKT)条件对该模型进行求解;其次,提出一种具有迭代思想的快速筛选法,可以对虚假数据注入攻击下的脆弱线路进行快速筛选;第三,提出一种多线路攻击策略,帮助电网运行人员对电网进行更深入评估;最后,通过在IEEE 39节点系统和IEEE 118节点系统上的仿真验证了攻击模型的合理性以及快速筛选法的可行性。

关键词: 电力信息物理系统, 双层攻击模型, 虚假数据注入攻击, 快速筛选

Abstract:

With the high integration of power grids and communication networks, false data injection attack has become a security hazard to the current power grids. In order to achieve the higher security level of power system in context of cyber-physical fusion, firstly, a bi-level attack model of false data inject attack under cyber-physical power system is proposed. The upper model represents the attack strategy of attacker, while the lower model represents the response of the power grid after attack. The model is solved using KKT conditions. Secondly, a rapid screening method with iterative ideas is proposed, which can quickly screen the vulnerable lines under the false data injection attack. Thirdly, a multi-line attack strategy is proposed to help grid operators conduct a more in-depth evaluation of the grid. Finally, the rationality of the attack model and the feasibility of the rapid screening method are verified through the simulation on the IEEE 39-bus system and IEEE 118-bus system.

Key words: cyber-physical power system, bi-level attack model, false data injection attack, rapid screening

中图分类号:

TM73

王竞才, 李琰, 徐天奇. 虚假数据注入攻击建模及攻击下脆弱线路的快速筛选[J]. 电力建设, 2022, 43(1): 104-112.

WANG Jingcai, LI Yan, XU Tianqi. Modeling of False Data Injection Attack and Rapid Screening of Vulnerable Lines Under Attack[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2022, 43(1): 104-112.

图/表 7

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迭代次数	线路号	潮流占比	迭代次数	线路号	潮流占比	迭代次数	线路号	潮流占比
1	18	1.386 0	21	65	2.106 8	41	121	0.894 6
2	186	2.106 8	22	94	3.411 3	42	88	1.000 0
3	115	3.411 3	23	57	1.000 0	43	95	1.0007
4	109	1.000 0	24	173	-1.160 9	44	156	2.106 8
5	126	-1.255 1	25	153	-1.085 5	45	128	3.411 3
6	127	-1.085 5	26	78	1.000 0	46	91	1.000 0
7	178	1.422 6	27	77	1.159 3	47	134	-1.160 9
8	112	1.159 3	28	92	0.501 7	48	140	-1.085 5
9	30	0.501 7	29	131	0.883 8	49	143	1.000 0
10	179	1.016 2	30	98	-0.844 9	50	32	1.159 0
11	46	1.122 6	31	25	-0.639 9	51	158	0.501 7
12	60	1.493 9	32	22	2.981 2	52	56	-1.173 0
13	175	1.185 8	33	20	-1.222 6	53	110	0.717 8
14	169	1.406 7	34	3	-0.658 8	54	45	1.000 0
15	155	1.000 0	35	46	1.122 6	55	12	-1.160 9
16	102	-1.000 0	36	8	0.667 0	56	89	0.951 8
17	182	2.981 2	37	37	-1.000 0	57	129	-1.001 3
18	62	-1.000 9	38	93	0.872 4	58	171	-0.952 7
19	130	-0.917 4	39	99	-0.913 6	59	82	1.102 9
20	79	1.493 9	40	159	0.826 7	60	55	0.845 0

迭代次数	线路号	潮流占比	迭代次数	线路号	潮流占比	迭代次数	线路号	潮流占比
1	18	1.386 0	21	65	2.106 8	41	121	0.894 6
2	186	2.106 8	22	94	3.411 3	42	88	1.000 0
3	115	3.411 3	23	57	1.000 0	43	95	1.0007
4	109	1.000 0	24	173	-1.160 9	44	156	2.106 8
5	126	-1.255 1	25	153	-1.085 5	45	128	3.411 3
6	127	-1.085 5	26	78	1.000 0	46	91	1.000 0
7	178	1.422 6	27	77	1.159 3	47	134	-1.160 9
8	112	1.159 3	28	92	0.501 7	48	140	-1.085 5
9	30	0.501 7	29	131	0.883 8	49	143	1.000 0
10	179	1.016 2	30	98	-0.844 9	50	32	1.159 0
11	46	1.122 6	31	25	-0.639 9	51	158	0.501 7
12	60	1.493 9	32	22	2.981 2	52	56	-1.173 0
13	175	1.185 8	33	20	-1.222 6	53	110	0.717 8
14	169	1.406 7	34	3	-0.658 8	54	45	1.000 0
15	155	1.000 0	35	46	1.122 6	55	12	-1.160 9
16	102	-1.000 0	36	8	0.667 0	56	89	0.951 8
17	182	2.981 2	37	37	-1.000 0	57	129	-1.001 3
18	62	-1.000 9	38	93	0.872 4	58	171	-0.952 7
19	130	-0.917 4	39	99	-0.913 6	59	82	1.102 9
20	79	1.493 9	40	159	0.826 7	60	55	0.845 0