不同新能源渗透率下燃煤机组行为策略分析

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.05.002

电力建设 ›› 2022, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (5): 9-17.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.05.002

• 支撑碳达峰、碳中和的能源电力技术、经济和政策·栏目主持赵俊华副教授、邱靖博士、文福拴教授· • 上一篇下一篇

不同新能源渗透率下燃煤机组行为策略分析

张兴平¹^,²(), 何澍¹^,²(), 王泽嘉³^,⁴(), 张浩楠¹^,²(), 张又中¹^,²()

1.华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京市 102206
2.新能源电力与低碳发展研究北京市重点实验室(华北电力大学),北京市 102206
3.华北电力大学电气与电子工程学院,北京市 102206
4.新能源电力系统国家重点实验室(华北电力大学),北京市 102206

收稿日期:2021-12-13 出版日期:2022-05-01 发布日期:2022-04-29
通讯作者: 何澍 E-mail:zxp@ncepu.edu.cn;heshu@ncepu.edu.cn;jiplant@ncepu.edu.cn;z442192820@163.com;youzhong_z@ncepu.edu.cn
作者简介:张兴平(1972),男,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向为能源经济、电力市场、能源政策等,E-mail: zxp@ncepu.edu.cn。
王泽嘉(1998),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为柔性输电技术,E-mail: jiplant@ncepu.edu.cn。
张浩楠(1992),男,博士研究生,主要研究方向为电力市场、能源政策等,E-mail: z442192820@163.com。
张又中(1993),男,博士研究生,主要研究方向为综合能源系统与能源电力经济,E-mail: youzhong_z@ncepu.edu.cn。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(72074075);北京市自然科学基金项目(9212017)

Behavior Strategy of Coal-Fired Units under Different New Energy Penetration Rate

ZHANG Xingping¹^,²(), HE Shu¹^,²(), WANG Zejia³^,⁴(), ZHANG Haonan¹^,²(), ZHANG Youzhong¹^,²()

1. School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
2. Beijing Key Laboratory of New Energy and Low -Carbon Development (North China Electric Power University), Beijing 102206, China
3. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
4. State Key Laboratory of Altemate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources(North China Electric Power University), Beijing 102206, China

Received:2021-12-13 Online:2022-05-01 Published:2022-04-29
Contact: HE Shu E-mail:zxp@ncepu.edu.cn;heshu@ncepu.edu.cn;jiplant@ncepu.edu.cn;z442192820@163.com;youzhong_z@ncepu.edu.cn
Supported by:
National Natural Science Foundation of China(72074075);Natural Science Foundation of Beijing(9212017)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在不同新能源渗透率下,构建内嵌非合作与合作的主从博弈模型,从系统角度探讨了燃煤发电机组行为决策对机组经济性和碳排放的影响。该模型充分考虑了煤电机组的技术特性,以准确核算不同运行工况下燃煤机组碳排放量。算例结果表明:在新能源低渗透率条件下,发电机组之间的合作策略能够同时兼顾系统的经济效益与环境效益;随着新能源渗透率的提高,机组之间的合作策略依然可以取得较好的碳减排效果,但整体经济性有所下降;当新能源渗透率较高时,机组之间的非合作策略具有较好的整体经济性和碳减排效应。最后根据研究结论提出了相关政策建议。

关键词: 新能源, 混合博弈, 燃煤机组, 行为策略, 电力市场

Abstract:

This paper constructs a master-slave game model with embedded non-cooperation and cooperation game to explore the impact of coal-fired power unit decision-making on the economic efficiency and carbon emissions from a system perspective under different proportion of new energy penetration. The model takes into account the technical characteristics of coal-fired units to accurately account for the total emissions of coal-fired units in different operating conditions. The results show that, when the new energy penetration rate is low, the cooperation strategy among coal-fired power units has good performance in both economic and environmental benefits. With the increase of new energy penetration, the cooperation strategy among coal-fired power units is still helpful for carbon reduction, but the overall economy will decrease. When the level of new energy penetration is high, the non-cooperative strategy can enhance both economic and carbon reduction effects. Some valuable policy implications are proposed according to the research findings.

Key words: new energy, hybrid game, coal-fired unit, behavior strategy, electricity market

中图分类号:

TM611

张兴平, 何澍, 王泽嘉, 张浩楠, 张又中. 不同新能源渗透率下燃煤机组行为策略分析[J]. 电力建设, 2022, 43(5): 9-17.

ZHANG Xingping, HE Shu, WANG Zejia, ZHANG Haonan, ZHANG Youzhong. Behavior Strategy of Coal-Fired Units under Different New Energy Penetration Rate[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2022, 43(5): 9-17.

图/表 9

图1 混合博弈模型整体框架

Fig.1 Overall framework of the hybrid game model

图2 典型机组供电煤耗率曲线

Fig.2 Curve of coal consumption rate for power supply of typical units

图3 模型求解流程

Fig.3 Solution process of the proposed model

表1 各机组具体参数

Table 1 Specific parameters of each thermal power unit

图4 典型日负荷曲线

Fig.4 Typical daily load curve

表2 各情景下出清结果

Table 2 Clearance results under different scenarios

表3 各情景下机组运行状态

Table 3 Unit operating status under different scenarios

图5 电能量市场电量分配情况

Fig.5 Electricity distribution in the electricity market

图6 备用辅助服务市场电量分配情况

Fig.6 Electricity distribution in the reserve auxiliary service market

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不同新能源渗透率下燃煤机组行为策略分析

Behavior Strategy of Coal-Fired Units under Different New Energy Penetration Rate

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