计及联盟内部博弈的负荷聚集商优化运营策略

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.11.015

电力建设 ›› 2022, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (11): 151-160.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.11.015

• 电力经济研究 • 上一篇

计及联盟内部博弈的负荷聚集商优化运营策略

魏震波¹(), 郭家嘉¹(), 田轲², 梁政¹(), 易刚春³

1.四川大学电气工程学院, 成都市 610065
2.国网四川省电力公司天府新区供电公司,成都市610000
3.四川电力设计咨询有限责任公司,成都市610041

收稿日期:2022-03-23 出版日期:2022-11-01 发布日期:2022-11-03
通讯作者: 郭家嘉 E-mail:weizhenbo@scu.edu.cn;carrie_guo.cq@foxmail.com;liangzh2011@163.com
作者简介:魏震波(1978),男,博士,副教授,主要研究方向为复杂系统及其理论、电力系统安全稳定分析与控制及电力市场,E-mail: weizhenbo@scu.edu.cn;
田轲(1993),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为电力市场;
梁政(1992),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为电力市场,E-mail: liangzh2011@163.com;
易刚春(1996),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为为复杂系统及其理论。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(52077146)

Optimizing Operation Strategy for Load Aggregator Considering the Internal Game in the Alliance

WEI Zhenbo¹(), GUO Jiajia¹(), TIAN Ke², LIANG Zheng¹(), YI Gangchun³

1. College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
2. State Grid Sichuan Electric Power Company Tianfu New District Power Supply Company, Chengdu 610000, China
3. Sichuan Electric Power Design Consulting Co., Ltd., Chengdu 610041, China

Received:2022-03-23 Online:2022-11-01 Published:2022-11-03
Contact: GUO Jiajia E-mail:weizhenbo@scu.edu.cn;carrie_guo.cq@foxmail.com;liangzh2011@163.com
Supported by:
National Natural Science Foundation of China(52077146)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

考虑到作为“联盟组织者”的负荷聚集商与作为“联盟成员”的用户间的博弈关系直接影响联盟整体对外竞价及盈利能力,文章以负荷聚集商参与调峰市场为场景,基于纳什讨价还价理论,对负荷调峰效果、负荷聚集商出清能力等因素进行量化并作为不同博弈主体的谈判筹码,建立了负荷聚集商与各类型用户体之间的收益分配模型,并依据用户对调峰电价与电量的不同态度,构建了用户满意度指标。算例仿真结果表明:所提模型能够保证联盟稳固同时增加联盟整体收益,且能合理有效地对主体收益进行分配;制定浮动电价策略能够对用户需求响应形成正向激励,同时提高合作双方的收益。整体与个体的双赢结果验证了所提方法的合理性与优越性。

关键词: 负荷聚集商, 纳什讨价还价, 用户满意度, 收益分配, 浮动电价

Abstract:

Considering that the game relationship between load aggregators as the organizers and users as the members of the alliance directly affects the overall external bidding and profitability of the alliance, this paper takes the scenario of load aggregator’s participation in the peak-shaving market, factors such as load peak regulation effect and load aggregator’s clearing ability are quantified and used as bargaining chips for different game subjects based on Nash’s bargaining theory. A revenue distribution model between load aggregators and various types of users is established. According to the different attitudes of peak electricity price and electricity, the user satisfaction index is constructed. The simulation results of the numerical example show that the proposed model can ensure the stability of the alliance and increase the overall income of the alliance, and can reasonably and effectively distribute the income of the main bodies. The strategy of formulating a floating electricity price can form positive incentives for user demand response and improve the income of both parties. The overall and individual win-win results verify the rationality and superiority of the method proposed in this paper.

Key words: load aggregator, Nash bargaining, customer satisfaction, income distribution, floating electricity price

中图分类号:

TM732

魏震波, 郭家嘉, 田轲, 梁政, 易刚春. 计及联盟内部博弈的负荷聚集商优化运营策略[J]. 电力建设, 2022, 43(11): 151-160.

WEI Zhenbo, GUO Jiajia, TIAN Ke, LIANG Zheng, YI Gangchun. Optimizing Operation Strategy for Load Aggregator Considering the Internal Game in the Alliance[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2022, 43(11): 151-160.

图/表 15

图1 求解流程

Fig.1 Solution flow chart

表1 可削减负荷基本参数

Table 1 Basic parameters of reducible load

表2 可转移负荷基本参数

Table 2 Basic parameters of transferable load

表3 储能设备基本参数

Table 3 Basic parameters of energy storage equipment

图2 可削减负荷响应结果

Fig.2 Response results of reducible load

图3 可转移负荷响应结果

Fig.3 Response results of transferable load

图4 储能设备响应结果

Fig.4 Response results of energy storage equipment

表4 收益分配结果

Table 4 Revenue distribution results

图5 不同类型用户满意度

Fig.5 Different types of user satisfaction

图6 基础电价下各负荷响应容量

Fig.6 Response capacity of each load under base electricity price

图7 浮动电价下各负荷响应容量

Fig.7 Response capacity of each load under floating electricity price

图8 基础电价下各负荷用户满意度

Fig.8 Customer satisfaction of each load under base electricity price

图9 浮动电价下各负荷用户满意度

Fig.9 Customer satisfaction of different loads under floating electricity price

表5 不同电价下收益分配结果

Table 5 Results of income distribution under different electricity prices

图A1 历史调峰电价及出清电量

Fig.A1 Historical peak electricity price and clear electricity

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计及联盟内部博弈的负荷聚集商优化运营策略

Optimizing Operation Strategy for Load Aggregator Considering the Internal Game in the Alliance

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