【目的】 规范市场行为、优化资源配置需合理设定电力市场操纵处罚措施。借鉴国际成熟经验对完善我国电力市场监管体系具有重要意义。 【方法】 从处罚的一般理论出发，针对性探讨了欧美电力市场监管部门对多种电力市场操纵行为的处罚理论依据和实践措施，通过介绍欧美具体法规、法律理念和电力市场的处罚实例，对比不同国家在处罚前提和处罚力度上的异同点，结合执法效果总结各自得失。 【结果】 欧美电力监管对操纵行为的处罚前提基本一致，但具体法律规则存在差异。在处罚力度上，美国模式对确定违规收益更高效，法国模式对不确定收益或未发生损害时更具确定性和威慑力。 【结论】 结合我国电力市场的发展现状，对我国市场操纵方面的监管和处罚措施提出以下建议：判定违规时剔除主观故意；设置威慑与赔偿双重功能的罚款基数以及与危害程度相匹配的梯度化罚款金额；教育与处罚并重，提升监管效果。

[Objective] Ensuring the normal operation of the price mechanism and auxiliary mechanisms is an important goal for the future regulation of China's electricity market. Summarizing the regulatory practices of mature international electricity markets in dealing with behaviors that disrupt the price mechanism and auxiliary mechanisms，and comparing the penalty rules for violations in different countries，is of great significance for improving China's electricity market system. [Methods] Grounding its analysis in penal theory，this study conducts a focused investigation into the jurisprudential rationales and operational methodologies employed by EU and U.S. electricity market regulators to sanction manipulative practices. Through a comparative examination of statutory frameworks，regulatory philosophies，and empirical enforcement cases，the research systematically contrasts jurisdictional variations in both legal thresholds for liability and gradations of punitive severity. The concluding synthesis assesses enforcement efficacy to derive comparative insights into regulatory paradigm effectiveness. [Results] While Europe and the U.S. differ significantly in specific legal provisions governing penalties，their electricity regulators apply identical thresholds for initiating enforcement actions against market manipulation. While the U.S. model presents more efficient for quantifiable illegal gains，the French model provides clearer outcomes for uncertain gains. When no illegal gains or harm have yet occurred，the French model exerts stronger deterrence against non-compliant firms. [Conclusions] In light of China's evolving electricity market landscape，this article advances three policy recommendations： excluding the element of intention for violation determination； establishing a fine base with dual deterrence and compensation functions，coupled with fines graded by harm severity； education and penalties are combined to enhance regulatory effectiveness.