关键词: 虚拟电动汽车聚合商, 动态电量上网电价, Rubinstein博弈, 规模效益

Abstract: The construction and development of the power internet of things provides hardware and technical support for the interconnection of equipment in the power system. As the innovation of traditional fossil fuel vehicles， the large-scale grid-connection of electric vehicles can not only stimulate the consumption of renewable energy， but also serve as mobile energy storage devices to participate in power supply. In this context， this paper innovatively introduces the concept of dynamic electricity for the game of electric vehicles on grid-fed price. By establishing Rubinstein game model， this paper studies the dynamic game between the virtual electric vehicle aggregator and the grid about the on-grid price of clean energy. According to the game model of different amount of clean energy utilization， the game equilibrium solution of electricity price for limited-times discharge is obtained and deepening research will be expanded to infinite game. At the same time， combined with the current development speed of electric vehicles in China， the paper considers the changes of benefits of both sides of the game in the actual trading process under different market scales. Through the simulation analysis， it is found that the game benefit in the finite game will be affected by the total game times and the industrial scale of both sides. Whether the infinite game can reach the optimal solution in the transaction depends on the market structure of the both sides of the game. It is concluded that increasing the industrial scale of EV aggregators can effectively increase the benefits of aggregators， improve the economic efficiency of EV and promote the consumption of clean energy.

Key words: virtual electric vehicle aggregator, dynamic electricity discharge price, Rubinstein game, scale benefit