促进能源转型的煤电容量电价激励机制设计

吕媛; 何永秀; 田冰颖; 庞越侠; 龙梦雨

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电力建设 ›› 0

促进能源转型的煤电容量电价激励机制设计

吕媛¹, 何永秀¹, 田冰颖¹, 庞越侠², 龙梦雨³

作者信息 +

Design of Capacity Tariff Incentive Mechanism for Coal Power to Promote Energy Transition

LÜ Yuan¹, HE Yongxiu¹, TIAN Bingying¹, PANG Yuexia², LONG Mengyu³

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摘要

【目的】为提升容量电价机制在推动能源转型中的引导能力,解决现行机制下存在的补偿不精准以及对低碳、高灵活性燃煤机组激励不足的问题,构建了一种计及能源转型目标的燃煤机组容量电价优化机制。【方法】梳理了燃煤机组的成本疏导路径,构建了包含机组运行决策模型、电力市场出清模型与容量电价优化模型在内的三层嵌套式模型体系,形成“机组-市场-地区-机制”的动态循环反馈链;提出了基于排序的燃煤机组能源转型激励模型,从灵活性水平与碳排放水平2个维度确定激励对象与补偿标准;并选取新能源富集区与水电富集区的典型日,开展分地区、分季节算例分析。【结果】仿真结果表明,基于灵活性水平的激励策略在高辅助服务需求场景下能够有效促进能源转型,但在辅助服务需求较低的情形下可能起到抑制作用;而基于碳排放水平的激励策略在各类典型日与地区中均展现出稳定的能源转型促进效果,具有广泛适用性。各激励方案对终端电价影响均较小（不超过0.038元/kWh）,具备良好的经济可行性。【结论】燃煤机组容量电价机制应当根据区域电源结构和季节负荷特征差异,实行分地区、分季节的差异化实施策略。建议当前阶段优先推行基于碳排放水平的容量激励策略;在新能源渗透率进一步提升的背景下,逐步引入对灵活性水平的联合激励。

Abstract

[Objective] To enhance the guiding role of the capacity tariff mechanism in facilitating energy transition and address the issues of imprecise compensation and insufficient incentives for low-carbon and highly flexible coal-fired generating units under the current mechanism, this study develops a capacity tariff optimization model that incorporates energy transition objectives for coal power units. [Methods] The study first analyzes the cost pass-through path of coal-fired units and constructs a three-layer nested modeling framework consisting of a unit operation decision model, a power market clearing model, and a capacity tariff optimization model, thereby forming a dynamic feedback chain among "unit-market-region-mechanism." On this basis, an incentive model for coal-fired units targeting energy transition is proposed, in which the incentive targets and compensation levels are determined based on unit flexibility and carbon emission levels using a sorting algorithm. Simulation analyses are conducted for typical days in new energy-rich and hydropower-rich regions, considering both regional and seasonal variations. [Results] Simulation resultsshow that the flexibility-based incentive strategy can effectively promote energy transition in scenarios with high ancillary service demand, but may inhibit transition in low-demand scenarios. In contrast, the carbon-based incentive strategy demonstrates stable and positive effects on energy transition across all regions and scenarios, indicating broad applicability. All proposed incentive strategies cause only marginal increases in end-user electricity prices (within 3.8 cents/kWh), confirming their economic viability. [Conclusions] The capacity tariff mechanism for coal-fired power units should be implemented with differentiated regional and seasonal strategies based on variations in power source composition and load characteristics. It is recommended to initially adopt a carbon-based incentive scheme in the current stage. As the penetration of renewable energy continues to rise, joint incentives based on both carbon emissions and flexibility should be gradually introduced to enhance the low-carbon performance and regulation capabilities of coal units, thereby supporting the development of a new-type power system and the achievement of energy transition goals.

导出引用

吕媛, 何永秀, 田冰颖, 庞越侠, 龙梦雨. 促进能源转型的煤电容量电价激励机制设计[J]. 电力建设. 0

LÜ Yuan, HE Yongxiu, TIAN Bingying, PANG Yuexia, LONG Mengyu. Design of Capacity Tariff Incentive Mechanism for Coal Power to Promote Energy Transition[J]. Electric Power Construction. 0

中图分类号： TM

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