• CSCD核心库收录期刊
  • 中文核心期刊
  • 中国科技核心期刊

电力建设 ›› 2018, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (8): 24-31.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-7229.2018.08.004

• 调度与优化策略 • 上一篇    下一篇

联盟理论下风-火-电动汽车协同调度消纳风电的优化算法及利润分配

孙波,王璐,李思敏,李志恒   

  1. 上海电力学院经济与管理学院,上海市 200090
  • 出版日期:2018-08-01
  • 作者简介:孙波(1982),女,博士,副教授,主要研究方向为最优化及智能电网需求侧管理技术; 王璐(1992),女,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为电力经济管理; 李思敏(1995),女,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为电力经济管理; 李志恒(1992),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为电动汽车入网机组组合调度研究。
  • 基金资助:

    上海市社科规划一般课题(2015BGL002)

Optimization Algorithm and Profit Distribution of Wind-Thermal-EV Cooperative Dispatch for Wind Power Consumption Under the Alliance Theory

SUN Bo, WANG Lu, LI Simin, LI Zhiheng   

  1. College of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200090,China
  • Online:2018-08-01
  • Supported by:
    This work is supported by General Subject of the Social Science Planning of Shanghai Municipality (No.2015BGL002).

摘要: 为促进电力系统多方主体的协同合作,系统成员间利润分配机制的合理制定至关重要。针对风电出力的随机性、波动性与反调峰性,本文首先将风、火发电机组打捆组成稳定的电力外送体系,并将其作为优先联盟与电动汽车(electric vehicle, EV)组成大联盟;其次,以利润最大为目标构建了大联盟及非联盟模式下的优化调度模型,并以不同调度模式下的利润结果为依据,利用Banzhaf-Owen值对大联盟及优先联盟内部成员间的利润进行分配;最后,通过核心理论判别该分配策略下风电商、火电商、电动汽车用户三者合作的可能性。算例仿真结果表明了大联盟内部成员联合调度可促进风电的消纳与发展,且采用Banzhaf-Owen值分配策略后,合作可以成立,大联盟及优先联盟内部成员均有可观收益。

关键词: 电动汽车(EV), 风电消纳, 优先联盟, 利润分配, 核心理论

Abstract:

In order to promote the collaborative cooperation of multi-party entities in the power system, the rational establishment of the profit distribution mechanism among system members is of utmost importance. In view of the randomness, volatility and anti-peaking of wind power output, this paper first bundles wind and thermal power to form a stable power transmission system, and forms a major coalition of priority alliances with electric vehicles (EV). Secondly, with the aim of maximizing profits, an optimal dispatch model under the major alliances and non-alliance models is constructed. On the basis of the profit results under different dispatch models, the Banzhaf-Owen value are used to make profits allocation among major coalitions and internal members of priority coalitions. Finally, the core theory is used to determine the possibility of cooperation among wind power providers, thermal power providers, and electric vehicle users under this allocation strategy. The example simulation results show that the joint scheduling of internal members of the Grand Alliance can promote the consumption and development of wind power. After the Banzhaf-Owen value allocation strategy is adopted, cooperation can be established, and major alliances and internal members of the priority alliance have considerable returns.

Key words: electric vehicle (EV), wind power consumption, priority alliance, profit distribution, core theory

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