• CSCD核心库收录期刊
  • 中文核心期刊
  • 中国科技核心期刊

ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION ›› 2020, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (9): 1-9.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2020.09.001

• Virtual Power Plant·Hosted by Associate Professor HU Zechun, Associate Professor LIU Dunnan and Senior Engineer WANG Xuanyuan· • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on Coalitional Strategy and Mechanism of Demand-Side Entities by Virtual Power Plant

HU Jiakai1,2, JIANG Chuanwen1, LI Lei3   

  1. 1. School of Electric Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
    2. Shinan Power Supply Company, State Grid Shanghai Electric Power Company, Shanghai 200233,China
    3. Shanghai Electric Power Trading Center Co., Ltd., Shanghai 200122, China
  • Received:2020-03-25 Online:2020-09-01 Published:2020-09-03
  • Contact: JIANG Chuanwen

Abstract:

As the subsidies of distributed resources decrease, to bid in day-ahead market by forming virtual power plant becomes a new income channel for demand-side entities. This paper designs a complete transaction mechanism from three parts to realize this mode such as bidding strategy, profit distribution and the formation of virtual power plant competing by demand-side entities. The bidding strategy model of price-maker virtual power plant is proposed, and the uncertainty is modeled on the basis of interval optimization. In addition, a generation quantity and uncertainty contribution based allocation mechanism is designed to distribute the profit. Then, this paper analyzes the stability of each coalition status to study the formation of virtual power plant. Finally, an example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. The results show that the proposed transaction mechanism conforms to the characteristics of the user-side stakeholders, and its allocation mechanism takes into account the stabilizing effect of participants on uncertainty, which can provide auxiliary decision-making for the user side stakeholders.

Key words: demand-side entities, virtual power plant, price maker, coalition game

CLC Number: