Abstract:

In order to ensure the proportion of renewable energy in power consumption in provincial regions, the government has introduced an assessment system for the responsibility weight of renewable energy consumption, which transfers the assessed party from the generation side to the user side. The change of assessment method will greatly affect the interests of thermal power producers and their enthusiasm to participate in tradeable green certificate (TGC). Thermal power accounts for a relatively high proportion of electricity generation in China. Whether thermal power producers respond positively to the green power market will greatly affect the implementation effect of the new policy. The government needs to set reasonable policy parameters to guide the trading strategies of thermal power producers so as to achieve the ideal equilibrium result of the game. According to the new changes, this paper constructs an evolutionary game theory (EGT) model that combines green power producers, thermal power producers and assessed users under bounded rationality, and simulates the evolution of thermal power producers’ strategies and the changing trend of TGC market under different parameters. The results show that, under the existing conditions, all thermal power producers will reach the ideal evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) point to participate in TGC trading within the policy parameter fluctuation of ±10%. However, when the policy burden increases, the rate of thermal power producers to reach ESS point will slow down significantly. The government should maintain or appropriately reduce the current policy burden level, and encourage thermal power producers to actively respond to TGC transactions, so as to ensure the efficient and stable implementation of the new policy.

Key words: power generation producer, evolutionary game theory (EGT), tradable green certificate (TGC), weight of accommodation responsibility