Bidding Strategy and Profit Distribution of Power Generation Company with Clean Energy in Spot Market Based on Cooperative Game Theory

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2020.12.015

Abstract

Abstract:

With the maturity of clean energy power generation technology and the decrease of its construction cost, power generation companies with clean energy gradually change from subsidy target to strategic market subject when they participate in the electricity market. On the one hand, thermal power units have good regulation capacity, but during the period of low expected energy prices, the high production costs may lead to the lack of competitiveness when they participate in the spot market bidding alone. On the other hand, generation companies have risk of loss due to bidding deviation caused by the uncertainties of clean energy output and spot market prices when participating in the power market competition, and thus the profit slumps. The joint bidding strategy of wind and thermal units can promote the complementary advantages and win-win development of the two. Firstly, in order to maximize the profit of clean energy generation companies participating in spot market bidding, a two-stage bidding model of a power generation company with clean energy is established, which is composed of wind power units and thermal power units, considering bidding deviation punishment. Conditional value at risk theory is used to evaluate the risk of deviation between clean energy and electricity prices, and the optimal bidding strategy is obtained. According to the nucleolus solution of cooperative game theory, the income distribution method between thermal power units and clean energy units is given. The simulation results show that the proposed method can effectively improve the profits of power generation companies with clean energy, reduce the impact of bidding deviation penalty on the profits of power generation companies with clean energy, and enhance the initiative of power generation companies with clean energy to participate in the spot market.

Key words: power generation company with clean energy, conditional value at risk, cooperative game, spot market

CLC Number:

TM73

LU Chengyu, JIANG Ting, DENG Hui, FANG Le, WANG Xu, JIANG Chuanwen. Bidding Strategy and Profit Distribution of Power Generation Company with Clean Energy in Spot Market Based on Cooperative Game Theory[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2020, 41(12): 152-160.

Figures/Tables 11

Fig.1 Operation mode of a generation company with renewable energy in spot market

Fig.2 Flowchart of calculation

Table 1 Parameters of thermal generators

Fig.3 Typical scenarios of wind power output

Fig.4 Typical scenarios of day-ahead prices

Table 2 Commitment schedule for uncoordinated thermal bidding

Table 3 Commitment schedule for coordinated thermal bidding

Fig.5 Bidding curves of the generation company with renewable energy when t=11

Fig.6 Bidding curves of the generation company with renewable energy when t=17

Fig.7 CVaR and expected revenues of the coalition under different risk-aversion parameters

Table 4 Expected revenue of each member in different coalitions

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