Analysis of Power Market Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms Adapted to High Penetration of Renewable Energy Development

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2021.03.014

Abstract

Abstract:

As the global trend to low-carbon power system transition, under the current power market framework, whether the market mechanisms can release correct price signals to ensure the adequacy of flexible power supply and reliable backup capacity in power system, whether the capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM, or CM) is necessary, and how to design the CRM are important issues for maintaining the sustainability of the power market. This paper firstly discusses the possible generation adequacy problems that may arise when a single energy market model is adopted for a high proportion of new energy power system, and quantifies the problems by constructing a screening curve model for power generation technology. Secondly, this paper summarizes the mechanism and specific contents of capacity remuneration mechanism design in foreign mature power market, and extracts three key elements of capacity remuneration mechanism design. Lastly, this paper points out the problems of capacity market mechanism design in China’s power market and provides forward relevant suggestions.

Key words: variable renewable energy development, power market design, capacity remuneration mechanisms, generation adequacy

CLC Number:

TM73

ZHANG Tao, HU Yuou, ZHANG Jing, HAN Liang, WANG Peiwen, HE Miao, CHEN Yuguo. Analysis of Power Market Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms Adapted to High Penetration of Renewable Energy Development[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2021, 42(3): 117-125.

Figures/Tables 10

Fig.1 Wholesale power market structure

Fig.2 Screening curve model

Table 1 Optimal generation capacity mixGW

Table 2 CRMs classification

Table 3 2020 net CONE values for different resource types in PJM RPM

Table 4 Wind capacity credit and calculation methods in US

Table 5 China installed capacity Mix during 2009—2019TW

Table 6 China generation percentage by technology during 2009—2019

Fig.3 SAIDI global comparison

Fig.4 Cross-zone capacity resource exchange

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