Game Model of Electric Demand Response Considering Benefit Sharing and Cost Allocation

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2021.06.014

Abstract

Abstract:

With the development of integrated energy system (IES), electric demand response has received widespread concentration as a method for releasing the potential of distribution network (DN). This paper proposes an EDR mechanism under IES. Firstly, a transaction framework is proposed for three stakeholders in the EDR: grid operator (GO), electric response coordinator (ERC), and integrated energy user (IEU). Then, in order to maximize the reliability improvement benefit of the DN, maximize the economic benefit for ERC, maximize IEU satisfaction and minimize the cost of energy consumption, a tri-stakeholder transaction model based on game theory is founded. Next, a benefit sharing means of equaling economic benefit from reliability improvement between GO and ERCs, and a cost allocation of equaling economic cost from electricity consumption decline between ERC and IEUs is established, which is caused by GO and IEUs participation in EDR. Finally, a method of optimization and solution for the proposed model based on the ACT theory and NSGA algorithm is presented, and case simulation demonstrates the validity and reasonableness of the proposed model.

Key words: integrated energy system, multi-stakeholder, trade mechanism, multi-energy optimization

CLC Number:

TM71

WU Yingjun, LIU Chengjun, LIN Zhiwei, SHI Zhanyu, LI Hu, WU Chen. Game Model of Electric Demand Response Considering Benefit Sharing and Cost Allocation[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2021, 42(6): 135-144.

Figures/Tables 11

Fig.1 The framework for electric response transaction among 3 stakeholders

Fig.2 Cost of declined electricity consumer satisfaction

Fig.3 Flow chart of method based on NSGA

Fig.4 Modified IEEE 33-node DN

Fig.5 Curves of different loads and PV generation

Table 1 Prices of energies

Fig.6 The electric DR volume of 3 ERCs

Fig.7 The electric DR condition of different ERC

Fig.8 The energy purchase result of node 24 after optimization by the proposed model

Fig.9 The influence of α on transaction

Fig.10 The influence of β on transaction

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