Optimizing Operation Strategy for Load Aggregator Considering the Internal Game in the Alliance

doi:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2022.11.015

Abstract

Abstract:

Considering that the game relationship between load aggregators as the organizers and users as the members of the alliance directly affects the overall external bidding and profitability of the alliance, this paper takes the scenario of load aggregator’s participation in the peak-shaving market, factors such as load peak regulation effect and load aggregator’s clearing ability are quantified and used as bargaining chips for different game subjects based on Nash’s bargaining theory. A revenue distribution model between load aggregators and various types of users is established. According to the different attitudes of peak electricity price and electricity, the user satisfaction index is constructed. The simulation results of the numerical example show that the proposed model can ensure the stability of the alliance and increase the overall income of the alliance, and can reasonably and effectively distribute the income of the main bodies. The strategy of formulating a floating electricity price can form positive incentives for user demand response and improve the income of both parties. The overall and individual win-win results verify the rationality and superiority of the method proposed in this paper.

Key words: load aggregator, Nash bargaining, customer satisfaction, income distribution, floating electricity price

CLC Number:

TM732

WEI Zhenbo, GUO Jiajia, TIAN Ke, LIANG Zheng, YI Gangchun. Optimizing Operation Strategy for Load Aggregator Considering the Internal Game in the Alliance[J]. ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION, 2022, 43(11): 151-160.

Figures/Tables 15

Fig.1 Solution flow chart

Table 1 Basic parameters of reducible load

Table 2 Basic parameters of transferable load

Table 3 Basic parameters of energy storage equipment

Fig.2 Response results of reducible load

Fig.3 Response results of transferable load

Fig.4 Response results of energy storage equipment

Table 4 Revenue distribution results

Fig.5 Different types of user satisfaction

Fig.6 Response capacity of each load under base electricity price

Fig.7 Response capacity of each load under floating electricity price

Fig.8 Customer satisfaction of each load under base electricity price

Fig.9 Customer satisfaction of different loads under floating electricity price

Table 5 Results of income distribution under different electricity prices

Fig.A1 Historical peak electricity price and clear electricity

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