• CSCD核心库收录期刊
  • 中文核心期刊
  • 中国科技核心期刊

ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION ›› 2023, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (5): 149-160.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2023.05.015

• Power Economic Research • Previous Articles    

Medium- and Long-term Trading Cooperation Game Decision of Power Generating & Trading Integrated Company Based on Dynamically Adjusted Risk Aversion Factor

YANG Hongming1,2(), WU Jingbin1,2()   

  1. 1. School of Economics & Management, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410114, China
    2. School of Electrical & Information Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, International Joint Laboratory of Ministry of Education for Operation and Planning of Energy Internet based on Distributed Photovoltaic-Storage Energy, Changsha 410114, China
  • Received:2022-08-08 Online:2023-05-01 Published:2023-04-27
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Foundation of China(72061147004);National Natural Science Foundation of China(71931003)

Abstract:

At present, China’s electricity market is mainly based on medium- and long-term transactions and is gradually transitioning to a market model of long-term transactions and spot transactions. As a new market entity, integrated power generation and trading companies face the risk of profit loss caused by uncertain factors, such as the unstable output of renewable energy generating units and load fluctuation of end users. In this study, a continuous dynamic adjustment method for risk aversion factors is proposed, and a conditional value risk model of profit and loss for power-generating and power-trading companies is developed. On this basis, the medium- and long-term trading profit under the cooperative game between power generation and power trading companies is consistently higher than the profit under the non-cooperative game as a constraint, and a medium- and long-term trading cooperation game decision-making model of integrated companies considering the risk of profit loss and the optimal shareholding ratio of power generation and power trading is proposed. Numerical simulation results show that the alliance transaction effectively improve the profits of all subsidiaries. The relationship between the value of the dynamic adjustment risk aversion factor and subsidiary trading profits is analyzed. The trading price interval for the cooperative game is provided.

Key words: medium- and long-term trading, power-generating and trading integrated company, dynamically adjustable risk aversion factor, cooperative game

CLC Number: