• CSCD核心库收录期刊
  • 中文核心期刊
  • 中国科技核心期刊

ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (2): 171-182.doi: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2024.02.015

• Power Economic Research • Previous Articles    

Collaborative Optimal Scheduling and Cost Allocation of Multiload Aggregator Considering Ladder-Type Carbon Trading

REN Hongbo1(), WANG Nan1(), WU Qiong1(), SHI Shanshan2(), FANG Chen2(), WAN Sha2()   

  1. 1. College of Energy and Mechanical Engineering, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200082, China
    2. Electric Power Research Institute, State Grid Shanghai Municipal Electric Power Company, Shanghai 200437, China
  • Received:2022-11-07 Published:2024-02-01 Online:2024-01-28
  • Supported by:
    Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China(52094021000C)

Abstract:

The large-scale penetration of renewable energy sources poses significant challenges to the stable operation of power systems. Driven by double uncertainties on both the supply and demand sides, demand response resources based on terminal flexible loads need to be explored. Considering the load differentiation characteristics of different types of users, multitype load aggregators based on cooperation and win-win were introduced. Flexible dispatching of the power system was performed based on the complementary characteristics of the heterogeneous load response behaviors. Moreover, each load aggregator was assigned the dual status of a carbon trading integrator to enter the carbon trading market. A carbon trading model based on a reward-punishment ladder was constructed using the electricity load forecasting method to allocate carbon emission quotas for a system free of charge. Based on this, to minimize the sum of the operating costs of a cooperative alliance of multiple load aggregators, a pre-day optimization model of the interaction and cooperation among multiple aggregators was developed and solved. The Shapley value method was introduced for the cooperative game, and the cost was shared according to the contribution of each participant to the operation of the cooperative alliance. The results show that the overall and individual operational costs and the carbon emissions of the alliance are significantly reduced under the cooperative operation mechanism.

Key words: demand response, carbon trading, load aggregator, cost allocation, cooperative game

CLC Number: