An Evolutionary Model of Electricity Sales Market Considering Changes in Rational Hierarchy and Belief Structure for Subjective

LIU Zhen, JING Guangmi

Electric Power Construction ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (10) : 168-180.

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Electric Power Construction ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (10) : 168-180. DOI: 10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2025.10.015
Power Economics

An Evolutionary Model of Electricity Sales Market Considering Changes in Rational Hierarchy and Belief Structure for Subjective

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Abstract

[Objective] To deepen the reform of the electricity retail market, this study addresses the emergence of excess returns obtained by electricity retailers due to the heterogeneity of market players' beliefs, which undermines market stability. Accordingly, an evolutionary model of the electricity retail market is constructed based on bounded rationality, incorporating the belief structures of user groups and the rational hierarchy of electricity retailers. [Methods] K-level and CH-level models are employed to represent the belief structure of user groups and the rational decision-making hierarchy of electricity retailers, respectively. A quotation strategy equation for electricity retailers is provided. Based on the distribution of rational hierarchies, a replicator dynamics equation is proposed to analyze the correction of optimal quotation strategies and the evolutionary process of electricity retailers' rational hierarchies under varying belief structures of user groups. [Results] The study shows that when the user group’s belief structure is 0‰—indicating no consensus on the electricity retail market—the electricity retailer's quotation is 1.91 CNY/kWh. When the belief structure is 20‰—with 20 out of 1000 users reaching consensus—the quotation decreases to 0.45 CNY/kWh. When the belief structure reaches 1—indicating full consensus among all 1000 users— the electricity retailer's quotation rises slightly to 0.59 CNY/kWh. [Conclusions] The belief structure of user groups reflects the initial, expansion, and mature stages of electricity retail market reform. The findings indicate: (1) In the initial stage, insufficient cognition of the user group enables electricity retailers to obtain high profits through elevated quotations; regulatory focus should be on building market confidence and ensuring effective market operation. (2) In the expansion stage, as user rationality improves, electricity retailers adopt low-price strategies to capture market share; regulation should target the prevention of monopolistic behavior. (3) In the mature stage, the electricity retail market reaches a stable state of sustained growth; regulatory efforts should promote technological advancement and brand innovation.

Key words

electricity retail market / market equilibrium / rational hierarchy / evolutionary model / belief structure

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LIU Zhen , JING Guangmi. An Evolutionary Model of Electricity Sales Market Considering Changes in Rational Hierarchy and Belief Structure for Subjective[J]. Electric Power Construction. 2025, 46(10): 168-180 https://doi.org/10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2025.10.015

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&nbsp;ABSTRACT: &nbsp;In the new round of electricity market reform in China, power sales side market liberalization is one of the key contents, which encourages more participants to enter the electricity market and poses challenges to the electricity retailers operations. How to adapt to the retailing side market and succeed in the fierce competition is the primary consideration for most electricity retailers. This paper analyzes the business model and development course of foreign electricity retailers, in order to give reference for the development of Chinas retailing side competition. Firstly, &nbsp;foreign electricity retailers management models are studied, including the purchase and sale of electricity, risk management, value-added services and interregional business, etc. On this basis, the typical innovative business models of typical foreign electricity retail companies are listed in specific stages of their development process. Finally, challenges are analyzed which the current domestic sales companies may face, and suggestions are proposed from experience of international electricity retailing.<div>&nbsp;</div>
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In order to solve the economic dispatch problem of a typical retailer coping with the stochastic risk brought by the distributed generation and demand-side fluctuation, a bi-level optimization model with the introduction of random variables is proposed. In this model, the upper-level sub-problem aims to simulate the market clearing process of electricity and reserve auxiliary services, where market clearing price and market clearing electricity are the decision variables, while the lower-level sub-problem is formulated to minimize the costs of purchasing under time-of-use pricing given by the simulation of market clearing. The model is converted into a deterministic model by chance-constrained programming, and the equilibrium solution is obtained by iterations between the upper and lower layers, where the CPLEX solvers are employed to address the upper and lower level sub-problems, respectively. Finally, the impact of different confidence level on the decision carried out by retailers is clarified through the analysis of the numerical simulation of the bi-level optimization model. It is verified that the model can effectively reflect the impact of the decision-making behavior of retailers on the market clearing process.

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Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China(71573026)
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(SWU2309510)
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