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Analysis of Information-Physical Coordinated Attack Paths Based on Vulnerability of Critical Nodes in Cyber-Physical Power System
LIU Wei, LI Ke, WEI Xingshen, WANG Qi
Electric Power Construction ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (12) : 96-106.
PDF(2706 KB)
PDF(2706 KB)
Analysis of Information-Physical Coordinated Attack Paths Based on Vulnerability of Critical Nodes in Cyber-Physical Power System
[Objective] Traditional power systems have evolved into more efficient and controllable cyber-physical systems （CPS） with the integration of advanced digital information technology and power physical systems. However，this also increases the risk of cyber-physical collaborative attacks. [Methods] This study analyzes the sources of physical system security incidents caused by information system security threats，categorizes the types of cyber-physical collaborative attacks，and establishes two typical attack scenarios. A simplified single-sided network structure of the power CPS was modeled based on complex network theory and energy-information flows. A three-layer cyber-physical power system network node one-to-one dependency framework was built using the correlation matrix theory. The evolution model of cascading failures in cyber-physical power system nodes was proposed，and a weighted comprehensive centrality index was designed to assess the vulnerability of key nodes. [Results] By simulating different cyber-physical collaborative attack strategies，the node survival rate performance under continuous attacks or failures is analyzed. The accuracy of this method in identifying cyber-physical attack paths is validated. [Conclusions] This study provides a technical reference for the security risk analysis of critical nodes and stable operation control in practical power systems.
cyber physical system （CPS） / cyber-attack / cyber-physical security / key node identification / vulnerability assessment
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